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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States today, lawyers are subject to "multiple
centers of professional control."1 Professional norms for American
lawyers spring from a variety of sources and are enforced in a
variety of systems.2 Occasionally, those responsible for establishing
norms differ from those operating norm-enforcement systems.3
Further, the same lawyer misconduct can violate norms emanating
from several different sources and can attract the attention of several
norm enforcers.4 This "multi-door" approach 5 has been generally
accepted because no single scheme "is likely to address all categories
of lawyer misconduct efficiently."6
The varied norms and norm-enforcement systems for controlling
lawyer conduct have generated much confusion. Even the terminology is puzzling. Consider the phrase "disciplinary action." For many,
it means an independent proceeding concerning lawyer misconduct
outside the scope of any traditional civil or criminal case. The
consequences of such disciplinary action might be the loss of a law
license, or some lesser public interest sanction such as a reprimand.
Such disciplinary action usually is conducted before a state's high
court lawyer disciplinary agency.7 Yet for others, "disciplinary
David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 804 (1992).
2 See, e.g., id. at 805-09 (identifying four basic enforcement models: disciplinary, liability,

institutional, and legislative controls, and discussing each model's source of authority).
' See id. at 805 (stating that the reference point for the disciplinary control "model is the
current disciplinary system, in which independent agencies... investigate and prosecute
violations of the rules of professional conduct" while the rules are adopted by the state's
highest court). In Illinois, a Hearing Board comprised of lawyer and non-lawyer appointees
may reprimand an attorney, or recommend disciplinary action by the court, see ILL. SuP. CT.
R. 753(c), but the rules are adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court, see ILLINOIS RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, reprinted in ILLINOIS CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND RULES OF
COURT: STATE AND FEDERAL 396 (West 1996) [hereinafter ILL. RPC].
" See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 1, at 805-09 (explaining that state disciplinary bodies,
legislative or executive agencies, courts, clients, and third parties are all potential norm
enforcers).
' Id. at 851 n.228 (borrowing the phrase from Frank E.A. Sander, Alternative Methods of
Dispute Resolution:An Overview, 37 FLA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1985)).
' Id. at 804. But see Linda S. Mullenix, Multiforum Federal Practice:Ethics and Erie, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 89, 129-31 (1995) (concluding that federal practitioners need only one
uniform code of professional ethics and that standards should not vary from district to district
or circuit to circuit).
See Wilkins, supra note 1, at 805; see also MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT Rule 2 (1989) (establishing "one permanent statewide agency to administer the
lawyer discipline and disability system").
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action" might also connote a proceeding on lawyer misconduct within
a traditional civil or criminal case. The proceeding might lead not
only to a public interest sanction, but also to a private interest
sanction such as an award of attorney's fees.'
The differing standards and forums which address lawyer
misconduct during federal litigation illustrate the multiple centers
of professional control. Applicable norms spring chiefly from federal
procedural rules,9 statutes ° and inherent power cases," as well
as from state lawyer conduct codes 2 and state malpractice cases. 3
Available enforcement systems exist at both the federal and state
levels. These enforcement systems include: a lawyer disciplinary
proceeding before an agency of the state high court which licensed
" Compare the pre-1983 version of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
several contemporary state civil procedure laws, e.g., COLO. R. CIw. P. 11, ILL. Sup.CT. R. 137,
and MASS. R. Cw. P. 11, with Rule 8 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States,
and several contemporary state high court rules, e.g., N.J. R. CT. 1:20-15(f)(3), TENN. R. SUP.
CT. 9, § 5.5, and TX. R. CT. 3. The former allow "appropriate disciplinary action" during a civil
case for a willful violation of the rule on signing pleadings, while the latter allow "appropriate
disciplinary action" in a separate proceeding for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. See
generally 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 10.13, at 708 n.3
(4th ed. 1996) (listing all state equivalents to FED. R. Cwr. P. 11).
9 See, e.g., FED. R. Cir. P. 11 (imposing sanctions for improper signing of pleadings); id. R.
37 (imposing sanctions for failing to make disclosures or cooperate in discovery). Also, local
federal district court rules usually set additional norms, typically relying upon a state high
court or American Bar Association standards. See infra notes 12-13.
10 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994) (providing that attorneys may be liable for excess costs
and expenses incurred because of unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of proceedings).
" See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980) ("[11n narrowly defined
circumstances federal courts have inherent power to assess attorney's fees against counsel.").
2 See, e.g., ILL. RPC 3.2, supra note 3 (requiring an attorney to "make reasonable efforts
to expedite litigation"). This rule is made applicable in some Illinois federal litigation. See
S.D. ILL. R. 29(d)(2) (stating that "[tihe Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by this Court
are the Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the Supreme Court of Illinois"). Compare
the Rules of Professional Conduct of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
3.2, a distinct set of rules which adopts ILL. RPC 3.2, supra note 3.
" When clients sue their attorney for acts of malpractice which occur during federal
litigation, their primary focus is on conduct normally governed by state lawyer conduct codes.
Thus, state tort or contract law should apply. Of course, not every violation of a state lawyer
conduct code gives rise to malpractice liability. See, e.g., MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 8,
§ 18.7, at 577-80 (explaining that a violation of the Model Rules or Model Code does not automatically result in civil liability); Charles W. Wolfram, The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility
as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation,30 S.C. L. REv. 281, 319 (1979) (noting
the lack of enhanced enforcement of lawyer conduct codes through malpractice suits). When
adversaries of their clients sue lawyers for acts of malpractice (e.g., malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, etc.) during federal litigation, state law usually applies as well. See MALLEN
& SMITH, supra note 8,§ 10.13, at 708-20 (noting that state sanction power is available to
federal courts in the absence of a federal provision). But see Jeffrey A. Parness, Groundless
Pleadings and Certifying Attorneys in the Federal Courts, 1985 UTAH L. REv. 325, 342-52
(urging application of federal common law principles where federal provisions are lacking).
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the lawyer ("disciplinary control"); a lawyer malpractice proceeding
typically commenced by an injured client before a state or federal
trial court ("liability control"); and a lawyer sanction proceeding
before the federal court hearing the case in which the lawyer's
misconduct occurred ("institutional control").14
The "multi-door" approach can present significant difficulties for
state-licensed lawyers interested in following the appropriate rules
during federal litigation.
For example, a securities lawyer might be placed in the
uncomfortable position of having to decide whether to follow
a series of SEC precedents that appear to require him to
resign from representing a client whom he strongly suspects
is involved in a fraudulent scheme, or a line of judicial
precedents that suggests that resigning under these circumstances constitutes malpractice.' 5
Consider also an Assistant U.S. Attorney facing conflicting federal
and state norms on ex parte communications during criminal
investigations. He or she must work through the conflict between
the Department of Justice's guidance permitting exparte communications with adverse, represented parties, and state prohibitions on ex
parte communications based on Model Rule 4.2 or Model Code DR 7104.16 The notion that a distinct set of professional norms under

14 See Wilkins, supra note 1, at 805-08. Professor Wilkins also notes that there are possible

"legislative controls," wherein executive or legislative branch agencies investigate and
prosecute lawyer misconduct. See id. at 808-09. To date, at best there are only a few such
agencies. According to Professor Wilkins, one example is the California State Bar Court, established by the State Bar Board of Governors to undertake attorney disciplinary proceedings
leading to public or private reproval or to recommendations to the state high court for
disbarment or suspension. See id. at 808 n.31. The Bar Court provides "a complete alternative
and cumulative method of hearing and determining accusations against members of the State
Bar," however, the high court's "inherent power" to discipline attorneys remains intact. CAL.
BuS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6075, 6100 (Deering 1993).
15 Wilkins, supra note 1, at 851 n.230.
'e See Elizabeth A. Allen, Federalizingthe No-Contact Rule: The Authority of the Attorney
General, 33 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 189, 190-91 (1995) (describing the conflict and the Department
of Justice's attempt to address the ethical problem by distinguishing a disinterested "party"
from a disinterested "person"); see also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 611
(1986) ("Although the matter is not entirely clear under the Code, probably DR 7-104(A)(1) and,
clearly, MR 4.2 prohibit contact with any represented person.... ."). Model Rule 4.2 reads, in
relevant part, "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of
the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer...."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1995). DR 7-104(A)(1) states, "During the
course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not: (1) Communicate or cause another
to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party he knows to be represented
by a lawyer.... " MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNSIBiLITY DR 7-104(A)(1) (1995).
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federal law should govern state-licensed lawyers litigating in federal
courts is currently under serious debate before the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States
Judicial Conference. 7 Some argue these norms should be comprehensive and displace any otherwise relevant state law,' s while
others urge there is a need for only particularized federal law, with
the remaining norms derived from state law.'9
The "multi-door" approach also can present significant difficulties
for those operating norm-enforcement systems covering lawyer
conduct during federal litigation.2" Problems include the potential
for under or over-enforcement, 2 ' as well as confusion over when
particular systems apply.22
While there is much current debate about professional norms for
federal litigators, there is relatively little talk of norm-enforcement
'7 See Memorandum from Daniel R. Coquillette, Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the U.S., Local Rules RegulatingAttorney Conduct in the Federal Courts (July 5,
1995) at 38-41 [hereinafter JudicialConference Report] (availablein Westlaw, Q247 ALI-ABA
311, 370-74) (further citations will be to the Westlaw cite).
'8 See id. at 370-71 (describing how such norms might be adopted). Strongly advocating
such norms is Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers
in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 460 (1996),
who urges the development of an independent set of detailed rules of conduct for lawyers
practicing in federal court via federal judicial rulemaking procedures. See generally Fred C.
Zacharias, FederalizingLegal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335 (1994) (making the case for uniform
legal ethics rules governing conduct in both federal and state courts via Congressional action).
Of course, the need for comprehensive or limited federal court norms, or for national norms for
all courts, presents differing questions than simply who should be making any such norms.
See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, JudicialPower and the Rules EnablingAct, 46 MERCER L. REV.
733, 733 (1995) (arguing that "congressional intrusion into federal procedural rulemaking is
the most significant contemporary issue of judicial independence").
19 See Memorandum from Daniel R. Coquillette, Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the U.S., Study of Recent Federal Cases (1990-1995) Involving Rules of Attorney
Conduct (Dec. 1, 1995) at 5-7. The Committee on Professional Responsibility of the New York
City Bar split almost evenly when it considered comprehensive versus narrow and
particularized federal ethics norms. See Committee on Professional Responsibility, Uniform
Ethics Rules in Federal Court:JurisdictionalIssues in ProfessionalRegulation, 50 REC. ASS'N
B. CITy N.Y. 842, 842 (1995).
' See Judicial Conference Report, supra note 17, at 333 (stating that the "balkanization" of
local rules contributes to problems for norm enforcers).
21 See Wilkins, supra note 1, at 851 (expressing concern that "involving multiple
actors in
the enforcement process might cumulatively result in significant overenforcement"). Concerns
about under-enforcement in state disciplinary boards of professional norms regarding conflicts
of interest led one federal court to a more relaxed standard for motions to disqualify opposing
counsel. See In re American Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 610-11 (5th Cir. 1992).
2 See Wilkins, supra note 1, at 851 (noting that "spreading enforcement authority... will
inevitably produce substantive and jurisdictional conflicts" and that "a lawyer might still find
herself confronting two control systems that express conflicting interpretations of the same
professional norm").
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systems. Some who urge the establishment of a new and comprehensive set of federal norms summarily conclude that their enforcement
must be undertaken in a new, unitary federal "disciplinary control"
system (i.e., not in a "disciplinary control" system established
independently at the district or circuit court level).23 Others
favoring federal norms wonder whether enforcement could be
undertaken in existing state high court "disciplinary control"
systems.24 To date, the U.S. Judicial Conference inquiry has
focused little attention on appropriate norm enforcers or on the costs
and benefits of employing multiple enforcement systems.25
Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had
occasion to reflect on norm-enforcement systems for lawyer misconduct during federal litigation. 2' During its own disciplinary
proceeding involving attorney Rufus Cook's conduct before a federal
district judge, it said that earlier federal and state norm-enforcement
efforts aimed at the Illinois-licensed lawyer should have been
Yet the desired
pursued in the spirit of reciprocal cooperation.
coordination was found lacking in the enforcement systems used for
the actual and alleged misconduct of Mr. Cook. 8 While indicating
2' See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 6, at 131 (arguing that a uniform federal code of ethics "will
eliminate all problems relating to interdistrict and intercircuit conflicts"); see also Burton C.
Agata,Admissions and DisciplineofAttorneys in FederalDistrictCourts:A Study and Proposed
Rules, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV.249, 285 (1975) (urging the adoption of a disciplinary structure in
"the federal courts, as well as the states[,]" that "provide[s] more centralization, greater power
and swifter action"); Stephen B. Burbank, State Ethical Codes and FederalPractice:Emerging
Conflicts and Suggestionsfor Reform, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969, 977-78 (1992) (arguing that
one of the benefits of a uniform federal enforcement mechanism would be the "demise of
provisions like [Federal] Rule 11 that obliquely and fecklessly regulate litigation conduct")
(footnote omitted).
' See, e.g., Allen, supra note 16, at 223 (discussing the benefits of state disciplinary board
enforcement of federal Justice Department norms on prosecutorial contact with represented
persons). See also 28 C.F.R. § 77.12 (1996) (providing that when U.S. Attorney General finds
a "willful violation" of certain Justice Department rules governing its lawyers, sanctions "may
be applied, if warranted, by the appropriate state disciplinary authority"). For a review of the
criticisms of the Justice Department rule, see generally, Jocelyn Lupert, Comment, The
Department of Justice Rule Governing Communications with Represented Persons:Has the
DepartmentDefied Ethics?, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1119 (1996).
' See JudicialConference Report, supra note 17, at 333-34 (outlining the problems that have
arisen due to the Committee's "do-nothing" approach in recent years).
26 See In re Cook, 49 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 1995).
See id. at 265 (explaining that reciprocal cooperation is one of three reasons for state
courts to enforce discipline for misconduct in federal court).
' The court was most displeased with the manner in which the Illinois Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) responded to its referral of Cook for
"[c]ircumventing and ignoring district court orders." Id. at 265 (quoting Alexander v. Chicago
Park Dist., 927 F.2d 1014, 1025 (7th Cir. 1991)). It also criticized "the surprising fact that the
district court, where the misconduct occurred, has never opened its own disciplinary
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its disappointment in the lack of coordination, however, the Seventh
Circuit said little about how to achieve better coordination.29
Techniques for coordinating enforcement efforts when statelicensed lawyers misbehave in federal court are important. Thus,
implementing a change need not await full debate and reform on
applicable professional norms for federal court litigators. Of course,
norms are not independent of norm-enforcement systems.3 ° There
is no guarantee that new professional conduct standards for federal
litigation will be enforceable through existing enforcement schemes.
However, the Cook case, among others, demonstrates that existing
norms governing lawyer conduct during federal litigation are poorly
enforced, in part because of the lack of reciprocal cooperation
between available norm enforcers. Part II of this Article will review
briefly the norms and norm-enforcement systems utilized and
available in Cook. Part III will offer suggestions on achieving better
coordination among the differing norm enforcers interested in the
federal litigation misconduct of lawyers.
II.

A.

THE COOK CASE

What the Seventh Circuit Said

Rufus Cook, a member of the bars of Illinois, the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Northern District), and
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Seventh Circuit),
represented a plaintiff class in a civil action in the Northern District
against the City of Chicago. 3 ' "Cook entered into a settlement on
behalf of one subclass, with 19 members, and abandoned efforts to
obtain relief for the remaining [class members]. Chicago agreed to
pay $500,000, a sum that included all costs and attorneys' fees, in
exchange for a release."32 The class action rule required approval
of the settlement by the district judge, Ilana Rovner."3
proceeding." Id. at 267.
' See id. at 265-66 (criticizing the ARDC for failing to proceed against Cook unless Judge
Rovner appeared as a witness). The ARDC stance was "equivalent to taking the position that
it will disregard misconduct in federal court, period. [The ARDC action] cannot be described
as a cooperative approach." Id. at 266.
' See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye,
Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1154 (1993) (stating that professional regulation and judicial
sanctions must "coexist").
" See Cook, 49 F.3d at 264.
32 Id.
"8See id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
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Cook waived any claim for attorneys' fees but sought to
recover $350,000 in expenses, which would have left just
$150,000 for distribution to the class. Judge Rovner disapproved this allocation of the proceeds, observing that the
expenses were inflated-and suspect as well, because much
of the work for which reimbursement was claimed had been
done by firms in which Cook or his former wife had an
ownership interest.
Judge Rovner concluded that the
combination of unusually high expenses and self-dealing was
intolerable and curtailed the award accordingly. 4
Both sides appealed, but before any decision on appeal was made,
another settlement was reached. 5
[The settlement] called for both sides to dismiss their appeals,
for the district court to vacate its opinion (which had been
highly critical of Cook's ethics and performance), and for the
district court to approve the original settlement. The
agreement, which the district court entered as a judgment,
provided: "Plaintiffs' counsel is hereby awarded statutory
costs of $128,705.68", the same amount Judge Rovner
originally had approved.
Chicago then disbursed the funds. Cook remitted
$150,000 to the class members, keeping $350,000 for
himself. When she found out what Cook had done, Judge
Rovner was appalled. She ordered Cook to pay the
residue, and when he did not pay she held him in
contempt of court.36
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision, rejecting Cook's procedural and substantive defenses." Cook's procedural defense was that
Judge Rovner had not afforded him a proper hearing.38 "Cook's
substantive defense was that he kept the $350,000 not under the
court's order but under contingent-fee contracts with the plaintiffs,
contracts that entitled him to full reimbursement for costs."3 9
Responding to these arguments, the Seventh Circuit reached the
conclusion "that Judge Rovner was entitled to find that she had
never been notified of these agreements." 0 Both Judge Rovner and
34

Cook, 49 F.3d at 264.

"

See id.

40

Id.

s Id. (quoting Alexander v. Chicago Park Dist., 927 F.2d 1014, 1021 (7th Cir. 1991)).
37 See Alexander, 927 F.2d at 1025.
3' See. id.
39 Cook, 49 F.3d at 264 (referring to Cook's substantive defense in the Alexander litigation).
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the Seventh Circuit found that when Cook "'disagrees with the
Court's rulings, [he] believes [he] has the right to ignore them.'""
At the conclusion of the Seventh Circuit opinion affirming the
contempt order, the court said:
This opinion sets forth in some detail the unprofessional
manner in which Cook Partners has prosecuted this litigation.
Although many of the issues raised by Cook are frivolous, we
see no point in heaping further sanctions on a lawyer and law
office facing large contempt fines. However, a copy of this
opinion will be submitted to the Illinois Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Commission with a suggestion that it
investigate the conduct of Rufus Cook and Cook Partners in
this litigation. Circumventing and ignoring district court
orders in the manner described above will not be condoned. 2
The Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission
(ARDC)
opened an investigation and compiled a large record. But it
did not reach a decision. Cook objected to any consideration
of Judge Rovner's findings, and the ARDC issued a subpoena
requiring Judge Rovner to appear and submit to crossexamination about the proceedings in her court and the
rationale for her findings. Not surprisingly, she declined,
observing that federal judges speak through their opinions,
and that their mental processes are not subject to examination. The ARDC's hearing panel then excluded from evidence
the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, its
opinions, and even the transcript of the proceedings in the
federal case. Following this decision, the Administrator of the
"

See id. (alterations in original) (quoting Alexander, 927 F.2d at 1022).

42 Alexander, 927 F.2d at 1025. The ARDC inquiry sparked by this 1991 referral was not

the first time the ARDC investigated Cook's conduct in the class action case before Judge
Rovner. In responding to the June, 1994 show cause order leading to his two year suspension,
Cook noted: "Even before the Court's 1991 opinion, the ARDC had previously investigated the
matters involved in the [ParkDistrict] litigation and had decided not to issue a complaint with
respect to those matters." Respondent's Motion for Clarification (June 23, 1994) at 3, Cook (No.
D-217).
It was not unreasonable for the Seventh Circuit to suppose the ARDC would demonstrate
reciprocal cooperation by deferring to Judge Rovner's findings of misconduct and only
independently considering the nature of any sanctions. In addition, Cook's stipulation before

the ARDC on the misconduct in the federal district court was reasonably foreseeable to the
Seventh Circuit. See, e.g., People v. Primavera, 904 P.2d 883 (Colo. 1995) (accepting hearing
board's recommendation that a former district attorney who stipulated to failing to pay courtordered child support in disciplinary proceeding after marriage dissolution could be publicly

censured).
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ARDC withdrew the complaint, and the inquiry [ended]. The
failure of the ARDC to complete its investigation led [the
Seventh Circuit] to open a disciplinary proceeding of [its] own.
[It] received the evidentiary record compiled by the ARDC
and [heard] oral argument. Cook was offered
an opportunity
43
to make a statement but declined to do so.

In its decision, the Seventh Circuit noted that there were three
main reasons it traditionally refers incidents of federal litigation
misconduct by lawyers to state bar officials. First, state "disciplinary
controls" have better "means to investigate charges of misconduct
and resolve factual disputes"; 44 second, the state bar has a "superior
perspective" on a lawyer's pattern of conduct; 45 and third, the state
46
bar should reciprocate the "principles of cooperative federalism"
which lead federal courts to defer to state judgments on lawyer
competence. Here, however, the Seventh Circuit found cooperation
had not been reciprocated because the ARDC's insistence on Judge
Rovner's appearance as a witness was tantamount to its "taking the
position that it will disregard misconduct in federal court."47
The Seventh Circuit observed that reciprocal cooperation by the
ARDC would have entailed giving "close consideration" to the
possible binding effect of the federal findings that Cook defrauded a
district judge and bilked his clients.48 It strongly hinted that upon
such review, the ARDC should find that it is not free "to decline to
respect federal judgments."49
In considering its own possible discipline of Rufus Cook in 1995,
the Seventh Circuit indicated surprise "that the district court, where
the misconduct occurred, [had] never opened its own disciplinary
proceeding."5 ° The court went on to note that the acts of contempt
before the district judge had occurred in 1989 and 1990;"'Cook had
repaid the class members; 2 and that there was "no indication that
Cook [had] misbehaved in any state or federal tribunal since
1990."5' The court also noted that Cook continued to defend his
"' Cook, 49 F.3d at 265 (citations omitted).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 id.
47 Id. at 266.
48
49

id.
Id.

'o Id. at 267.

6' See id.
5' See id.
53 Id.
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conduct, though the court opined that "[oinly theft from a trust fund
would be a clearer breach of an attorney's fiduciary duty to his
client"54 than the breach committed by Cook during the case before
Judge Rovner. This demonstrated that Cook's "clients remain[ed] in
need of judicial protection."55
The Seventh Circuit further noted that in the past, it had
"suspended from practice lawyers who fell behind in filing briefs or
56
who did not exert themselves in protecting their clients' interests."
The court concluded that "[ilt would be incongruous to permit a
lawyer who has diverted funds from clients to himself to remain in
good standing, while mere lassitude leads to suspension from
practice."57 As a result, the court suspended Cook from membership in the Seventh Circuit bar, although he was permitted to apply
for reinstatement after two years if he could then demonstrate that
he is "in good8 standing in all other jurisdictions where he is admitted
to practice."

B.

What the Seventh CircuitDid Not Say

1. Barriers to Reciprocal Cooperation by the ARDC
While the Seventh Circuit chastised the ARDC for failing to give
"close consideration" to the binding effect of Judge Rovner's finding
that Cook defrauded a district judge and bilked his clients,59 the
Seventh Circuit itself failed to consider closely the reasons the ARDC
paid little attention to preclusion principles. The ARDC's inattention
seemingly was prompted by the Illinois Supreme Court Rules which
limit the Hearing Board in the "disciplinary control" system to
deferring conclusively to only a few types of earlier judicial findings.
One rule states that "[iun any hearing conducted pursuant to this
rule, proof of conviction is conclusive of the attorney's guilt of the
crime."60 In cases where an attorney has been convicted of a crime
involving fraud or moral turpitude, the rule requires the Administrator to petition the court "praying that the attorney be suspended

64

Id.

55 Id.
66 Id.
57 Id.
68

59

at 267-68.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 266.

69 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 761(f).
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from the practice of law until further order of the court."6 ' The
court then issues "a rule to show cause why the attorney should not
be suspended ...

until the further order of the court."62 After the

court considers "the petition and the answer to the rule to show
cause, the court may enter an order, effective immediately, suspending the attorney from the practice of law until the further order of
the court."63 Another rule states that an Illinois-licensed attorney
who is also licensed in another state and who "is disciplined in the
foreign State,... may be subjected to the same or comparable

discipline in [Illinois], upon proof of the order of the foreign State
imposing the discipline."6 '
Because Cook was neither convicted of a crime involving fraud or
moral turpitude nor disciplined in a foreign state, the Hearing Board
in the ARDC proceeding felt it was required to conduct a new
hearing on his conduct in federal court. 5 This hearing had to be
conducted in accordance with the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure,
Illinois Supreme Court Rules, and the rules of the ARDC; at the
conclusion, "the standard of proof' would be "clear and convincing
evidence."66 Because the standard of proof in the civil contempt
proceeding before Judge Rovner also was clear and convincing
evidence, the Hearing Board in the ARDC proceeding should have
61 Id. R. 761(b). For a crime not involving fraud or moral turpitude, upon notice to the
Administrator ("the principal executive officer of the registration and disciplinary system," id.
R. 751(e)(1)), the matter is referred to the Inquiry Board, which upon "investigation and
consideration" votes "to dismiss the charge, to close an investigation, or to file a complaint with
the Hearing Board." Id. R. 753(a)(3). Seemingly, should a complaint result from the events
leading to a conviction of a crime not involving fraud or moral turpitude, the Hearing Board
would consider proof of conviction under the Code of Civil Procedure, the rules of the Illinois
Supreme Court, and the rules promulgated by the ARDC. See id. R. 753(c)(5).
62 Id. R. 761(b).
63

Id.

Id. R. 763.

's The ARDC prosecutor argued to the Hearing Board that its office was "not attempting to
use a civil judgment to estop Respondent from contesting the disciplinary charges at hearing."
Administrator's Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Counts II and III of the
Complaint at 4, in Volume III of Appendix to Respondent Rufus Cook's Memorandum of Law
in Response to the Court's Orders to Show Cause & Request for a Formal Hearing in the
Seventh Circuit at C39, Cook (No. D-217) [hereinafter Vol. III]. The ARDC prosecutor did urge
that papers from the federal court case were admissible evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. See Respondents' [sic] Memorandum of Law in Support of His Motion to Exclude
Documents Containing Statements Made By the Honorable Ilana Diamond Rovner from
Evidence at the Hearing at 3 in Vol. III, supra, at C501.

66 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 753(c)(5)-(6).

See, e.g., Stotler & Co. v. Able, 870 F.2d 1158, 1163 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that to find
a party in contempt of court, the complaining party must show "by 'clear and convincing'
evidence" that the opposing party disobeyed the court's order). This standard in contempt
6?
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been able to consider her findings if permitted by Illinois statute or
rule. In proceeding upon the complaint against Cook, however, the
ARDC Hearing Board did not find such consideration was required.6" Perhaps such deference was deemed foreclosed as it was
not included within the Illinois Supreme Court Rules on criminal
conviction and foreign state discipline. Or perhaps, even if issue
preclusion was available, it was deemed not to fit under Illinois law.
As the Seventh Circuit noted, "Illinois does not use offensive
nonmutual issue preclusion in attorney disciplinary proceedings."69
Finally, while the Hearing Board was aware that "state tribunals
must give federal judgments the same force that federal courts give
them,"7" it may have determined, as the Seventh Circuit speculated,
that "subsidiary issues" in federal judgments need not be respected
by state courts and that the findings as to Cook's conduct involved
such "subsidiary issues."7
A closer look at the Hearing Board's failure to consider the federal
judgment on Cook's contempt reveals several major barriers to the
types of reciprocal cooperation desired by the Seventh Circuit.
Incidentally, reciprocity should occur not only between the ARDC
and federal courts, but also between the ARDC and Illinois state
courts, between the ARDC and state courts outside of Illinois, and
between the ARDC and other disciplinary tribunals, such as
administrative agencies. One major barrier to reciprocity in cases
like Cook is that not all of the available professional norm-enforceproceedings has long been read to mean that the evidence must indicate that there is no "fair
ground of doubt as to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct." California Artificial Stone
Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U.S. 609, 618 (1885) (holding that the defendant should not be held
in contempt of a court's order that it cease using the plaintiffs patented paving process, where
the judges disagreed as to whether the plaintiff was indeed continuing the infringement); see
Robin Woods, Inc. v. Woods, 28 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that civil contempt "must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence," where the defendants were held in contempt for
failing to heed the court's order that they refrain from referring to defendant doll designer as
defendant corporation's employee); Fox v. Capital Co., 96 F.2d 684, 686 (3d Cir. 1938) (holding
that the plaintiff failed to carry the "heavy burden" of showing "by 'clear and convincing
evidence' that the defendant was guilty of civil contempt for failing to testify in a bankruptcy
proceeding).
's See In re Cook, 49 F.3d 263, 265 (7th Cir. 1995).
9 Id. at 266 (citing In re Owens, 532 N.E.2d 248, 252 (Ill. 1988) (holding that "factual
findings" based on clear and convincing evidence "in a civil fraud action" may not form the
basis for collateral estoppel against attorneys in ARDC proceedings, since "[tihe risk of unfairly
imposed discipline is too great, and the economy to be gained too minimal")).
70 Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 87 (1982) ("Federal law determines the
effects under the rules of res judicata of a judgment of a federal court.").
71 Cook, 49 F.3d at 266. The Seventh Circuit itself noted "there remains some question
about the extent to which states must respect federal decisions about subsidiary issues." Id.
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ment systems for lawyers are to be respected equally by a state's

disciplinary body.72 While the results as well as the underlying
findings in foreign state disciplinary control systems regarding the
conduct of an Illinois-licensed lawyer generally were respected, 3
the results in either a liability control system or an institutional

control system outside of Illinois regarding the conduct of an Illinoislicensed lawyer were not respected.74 Why is deference accorded to

a foreign state's disciplinary action, but not to the judgment of a
foreign state or federal court, in a lawyer liability civil action or in
a lawyer sanction proceeding? The answer to this question is
unclear. Seemingly, Cook has comparable incentives, tools, and
hearing opportunities when charged with contempt, legal malpractice, or the violation of a court rule, as when charged by a traditional
disciplinary agency with breaching a professional conduct rule-at
least in settings where the burden of proof remains clear and
convincing evidence. 5 While "courts must be more cautious in
allowing collateral estoppel to be used offensively than in allowing

72

This can be seen in the varying levels of deference the Illinois Supreme Court Rules afford

to different professional enforcement systems. For example, if an Illinois attorney is convicted
of a crime in Illinois, only "proof" of the conviction is sufficient to justify the attorney being
disciplined. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 761(f). And, if an attorney is subject to discipline in another
state he also may be subject to discipline by the State of Illinois upon a showing of "proof of
the order of the foreign State imposing the discipline," unless the procedures employed violated
due process principles. Id. R. 763. Yet, the high court rules are silent with regard to deference
accorded to other adjudicatory proceedings involving issues of attorney misconduct.
" See id. R. 763 (stating that an attorney disciplined in a foreign State may be subjected
to "the same or comparable discipline" in Illinois).
7" The situation is different outside of Illinois. See, e.g., GENERAL RULES U.S. DISTRICT
CoURT, EASTERN AND SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 4(d) (providing that discipline

imposed by another state or federal court may support an order of discipline), reprinted in
McKINNEY'S NEW YORK RULES OF COURT: STATE AND FEDERAL 1996 at 789 (West 1996); IOWA
SUP CT. R. 118.7 (providing that in state disciplinary proceeding, issue preclusion may be used
from a civil judgment where the burden of proof underlying the judgment is greater than
preponderance of the evidence); see also Bar Counsel v. Board of Bar Overseers, 647 N.E.2d
1182, 1185 (Mass. 1995) (concluding that offensive collateral estoppel is appropriate in some
bar discipline proceedings based on earlier civil judgments).
7 While the burden of proof in legal malpractice or in civil rule violation proceedings usually
is not clear and convincing evidence, that standard generally applies in civil contempt
proceedings. See Shepherd v. American Broad. Co., 62 F.3d 1469, 1475-78 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(discussing the punitive nature of inherent power sanctions and the social utility of using a
heightened standard of proof). Aside from contempt, other inherent power sanctions, such as
awards of attorneys' fees and the imposition of fines, may also require clear and convincing
evidence of lawyer misconduct as they too may be fundamentally punitive or penal. See id.
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it to be used defensively,"7 6 many of the pertinent reasons for
caution are inapplicable to most ARDC disciplinary proceedings.7 7
A second major barrier to reciprocal cooperation between the
ARDC and the federal courts is the lack of evidentiary standards
guiding the Hearing Board's consideration of certain earlier normenforcement proceedings. For example, where the burden of proof in
a lawyer malpractice action or sanction proceeding is preponderance
of the evidence, conclusive effect cannot be given their findings by
the Hearing Board because it employs a clear and convincing
evidence standard.7" It does not follow, however, that the Hearing
Board should not consider any part of the malpractice or sanction
case. In the ARDC hearing, when Judge Rovner declined to honor
the Hearing Board subpoena, her findings, conclusions, and opinions,
as well as the transcript of proceedings were excluded from evidence.7 9 The relevant Illinois Code, Supreme Court rules and
ARDC rules should provide an avenue for consideration of these
federal court materials as evidence, even if they are not conclusive.
2. Barriers to Cooperation Between Federal Disciplinarians
Along with its disappointment in the ARDC hearing, the Seventh
Circuit also expressed dismay over the district court's response to
Cook's misconduct. Upon finding that Cook defrauded the court and
7 In re Owens, 532 N.E.2d 248, 252 (Ill. 1988).
77 Illinois likely could not have joined as a party in Cook because no other inconsistent
determination of the same issue existed, and it was foreseeable that federal litigation misconduct would be referred to, and considered by, the Illinois ARDC. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS §§ 28-29 (1982). It should be noted that when the ARDC Hearing Board
deemed inadmissible Judge Rovner's opinions regarding Cook's contempt, it said that if Cook
"had known that Judge Rovner's remarks about him.., would be presented at a later date in
a disciplinary matter, he would have been placed in the awkward position of wanting to crossexamine Judge Rovner about her remarks... possibly to the detriment of his clients!" Order
Excluding Documents and Testimony at 2-3 in Vol. III supra note 65, at C509-10 [hereinafter
ARDC Order]. The ARDC Order did not explain why the Seventh Circuit's referral to the
ARDC in Alexander was not foreseeable to Cook or why an apparent conflict of interest
between Cook and his clients should not have led Cook to cease representing the clients. In
Florida, the high court resists the use of offensive collateral estoppel in bar discipline
proceedings where an administrative agency previously has disciplined an attorney because
the "primary purpose" of the agency "is not to ensure the qualification, supervision or regulation of lawyers." Florida Bar v. Tepps, 601 So.2d 1174, 1175 (Fla. 1992).
78 See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 753(c)(6).
" See In re Cook, 49 F.3d 263, 265 (7th Cir. 1995). While the Hearing Board did mention
the possibility that certain portions of the documents could be purged while the balance could
be admitted into evidence, it strongly hinted that not much would be left in the "balance
because all materials "prejudicial in nature" to Cook would be excluded. See ARDC Order,
supra note 77, at C509-10.
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bilked his clients, the Seventh Circuit called it "surprising... that
the district court .. never opened its own disciplinary proceeding."' ° But what was Judge Rovner or her colleagues to do? What
disciplinary proceedings could have been opened? A variety of
approaches to Cook's misconduct were available to the district court,
but guiding standards were lacking.81 The Seventh Circuit itself
said nothing of such choices, or of the techniques for facilitating
cooperation between federal district judges and the courts they serve,
or of better coordination between federal trial and appellate courts.
Also, the court said nothing about the processes for cooperation in
existence in 1989 and 1990, when the contempt before District Judge
Rovner occurred, or about the processes in place in 1995, when the
Seventh Circuit itself suspended Cook based on the 1989-1990
contempt. s2
In 1989 and 1990, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois had in place a series of local rules entitled "Discipline of
Attorneys."" One rule recognized that the court's "disciplinary
powers" were "vested in its Executive Committee."84 This committee was then charged with overseeing the investigation, prosecution,
and adjudication of lawyer misconduct matters. Such matters
included, but were not limited to, acts occurring during litigation
before the district court. 85 But the rules also expressly recognized
that lawyer misconduct in the district court could prompt other
responses, including referrals to an "appropriate state or local
disciplinary body"86 or the exercise of "the traditional powers of
each [district] judge to maintain decorum, dignity and integrity in
the courtroom and to compel obedience to its orders through the
contempt power."87 The rules did not elaborate on the nature of
these "traditional powers" or on the coordination of all the possible
responses to lawyer misconduct. These particular rules were also
quite comparable to earlier local court rules, including a rule on

80 Cook, 49 F.3d at 267.
"i See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text (discussing other disciplinary approaches).
82 See Cook, 49 F.3d at 268.
8 U.S. DIST. CT. N.D. ILL. LOCAL GEN. R. 3.50-3.59, reprintedin ILLINOIS CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE & RULES OF COURT: STATE AND FEDERAL 602-05 (West 1989) [hereinafter 1989
N.D. GENERAL RULES].
84 1989 N.D. GENERAL RULE 3.51(a), supra note 83.
85 See id. R. 3.55.
87 Id. R. 3.55(a).
17

Id. R. 3.50.
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discipline of attorneys adopted in April of 1974.8" Thus, Judge
Rovner was left on her own to determine what forms of "traditional
powers" she might exercise regarding Cook's conduct and in what
form, if any, she should forward her concerns and findings about
Cook to the court's Executive Committee or to the Illinois ARDC.8 9
At the time of the Seventh Circuit's disciplinary action against
Cook in early 1995, the district court's local rules entitled "Discipline
of Attorneys" 9° significantly differed from the rules in effect in 19891990. In 1991, the Northern District's rules on the disciplinary
process were altered when the court's new Rules of Professional
Conduct were adopted. 1 New local rules addressed Executive
Committee duties regarding disciplinary proceedings against lawyers
convicted of crimes, lawyers disciplined by other federal or state
courts, and lawyers who engaged in actual or alleged misconduct and
who had not been subjected previously to such criminal or disciplinary proceedings.92 Under the 1991 rules, Cook was a lawyer who
apparently engaged in actual misconduct, in that he had been found
to have committed acts of contempt before Judge Rovner, but he had
not been subjected to earlier related criminal or disciplinary
proceedings elsewhere.9 3 The 1991 rules did not expressly require
Cook or the clerk of the Northern District or anyone else to report
the actual misconduct within the contempt finding to the Executive
Committee or to the Illinois ARDC." 4 In addition, the rules did not
88 See U.S. DIST. CT. N.D. ILL. LOCAL GEN. R. 8 (repealed 1989) reprinted in ILLINOIS
PRACTICE ACT & RULES 1976, 433-36 (West 1976).
89 From 1989 through 1990, attorneys admitted to practice law in the Northern District were

obliged to follow "the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar
Association." 1989 N.D. GENERAL RULE 3.54(b), supra note 83. DR 1-103(A) of the Model Code
seemingly mandated that lawyers report knowledge of other lawyers' misconduct. MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A) (1980). But such reporting duties only
came to the attention of most Illinois lawyers with the decision in In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d
790 (111. 1988), involving a lawyer's misconduct toward a client, rather than a lawyer's violation
of a court order.
90 See U.S. DIST. CT. N.D. ILL. LOCAL GEN. R. 3.50-3.59, reprintedin ILLINOIS CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE & RULES OF COURT: STATE AND FEDERAL 737-41 (West 1996) [hereinafter 1995

N.D. GENERAL RULES].

9' See RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,
reprinted in ILLINOIS CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE & RULES OF COURT: STATE & FEDERAL 796-

829 (West 1996).
92 See 1995 N.D. GENERAL RULES 3.50-3.51, 3.53, supra note 90.
9 See id. R. 3.53(A).
Rufus Cook did have a duty to report to the Northern District the "public discipline"
imposed by another court, while the clerk had duties to gather certified copies of criminal
convictions and public discipline elsewhere. See id. R. 3.51(A), 3.59(A)-(B). Rule 8.3(a) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct of the U.S. District Court for Northern District of Illinois man-
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require the Executive Committee, upon learning of it, to view Judge
Rovner's findings as conclusive of actual misconduct in the same way
that earlier criminal convictions and disciplinary proceedings
establish facts conclusively.95 Judge Rovner and others may have
chosen to refrain from notifying the district court's Executive
Committee (or other norm enforcers, including those in other states
and courts where Cook was licensed to practice law) because the
contempt proceedings in the Northern District could have been
viewed as sufficient vindication of the public interest in regulating
Cook's professional conduct. Also, the proceedings could have been
viewed, in part, as a form of "vigilante discipline" which had
awakened Cook to concerns about his legal practice, and as an
"institutional control" response to misconduct which eliminated the
need, in a "multi-door" approach, for utilizing any "disciplinary
control."
In expressing surprise that Judge Rovner and her colleagues failed
to open "disciplinary proceeding[s]," 96 the Seventh Circuit not only
failed to articulate relevant techniques and guiding standards, but
also failed to explain why it delayed implementing its own Seventh
Circuit disciplinary proceeding until 1994, after the termination of
the ARDC inquiry triggered by the Seventh Circuit referral in 1991.
When the court did refer Cook to the ARDC in 1991, it noted that
there was "no point in heaping further sanctions on a lawyer and law
office facing large contempt fines[,]"97 suggesting that the remedies
in contempt, together with any ARDC action, would constitute
sufficient norm-enforcement. Perhaps its own disciplinary proceeding

dates that lawyers report misconduct involving certain criminal acts or "dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation" to authorities "empowered to investigate or act." This responsibility was infrequently assumed in Illinois, even after In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988).
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, DisciplinaryReferrals UnderNew Federal Civil Rule 11, 61 TENN.
L. REv. 37, 52-54 (1993) (noting that surveys in 1992-1993 indicate few Rule 11 violations in
federal courts reported to state disciplinary agencies). Compare the more explicit reporting
duties in California, where courts since 1990 are required to notify state disciplinarians of "any
judicial sanctions against an attorney, except sanctions for failure to make discovery or
monetary sanctions of less than one thousand dollars ($1,000)." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 6086.7(c) (Deering 1993).
9'But cf 1995 N.D. GENERAL RULE 3.50(C), supra note 90 (stating that a "certified copy of
a judgment of conviction of any attorney for any crime shall be conclusive evidence of the
commission of that crime"); id. R. 3.51(E) (stating that in most instances "afinal adjudication
in another court that an attorney has been guilty of misconduct shall establish conclusively the
misconduct"); id. R. 3.53(C) (allowing for an "evidentiary hearing" for other allegations of
misconduct).
In re Cook, 49 F.3d 263, 267 (7th Cir. 1995).
7 Id. at 265 (quoting Alexander v. Chicago Park Dist., 927 F.2d 1014, 1025 (7th Cir. 1991)).
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initiated in 1994 was deemed necessary to supplement the district
court contempt proceeding, after the ARDC failed to supplement the
proceeding and the large contempt fines were removed. 9
But why refer Cook to the ARDC in 1991, fail to open simultaneous Seventh Circuit disciplinary proceedings against him, and then
fail to suggest that the district court act against Cook? The answer
cannot be "reciprocal cooperation," because the Seventh Circuit and
the Northern District Executive Committee just as easily could have
respected Judge Rovner's findings in a 1991 federal disciplinary
proceeding, as the Seventh Circuit expected the ARDC to respect her
findings upon the 1991 referral. By contrast with such federal
disciplinarians, the ARDC likely did have a "superior perspective" on
Cook's pattern of conduct and a better "means to investigate" his
entire professional record.99 But why should discipline by the
federal courts, limited to federal court misconduct (which had
already been determined so that issue preclusion principles probably
applied), await Illinois ARDC proceedings? No good reason exists for
this state of affairs. As the Seventh Circuit noted in 1995, lawyers
who only "fell behind in filing briefs" and otherwise engaged in "mere
lassitude"
were routinely being suspended from practice in that
10 0
court.

III.

COORDINATING NORM-ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS FOR LAWYER
MISCONDUCT DURING FEDERAL LITIGATION

The benefits of coordinating norm-enforcement systems for lawyer
misconduct during federal litigation are self-evident. Yet such
coordination was lacking throughout the Cook matter, seemingly
because the Seventh Circuit failed to articulate techniques and
standards for better coordination in the earlier Alexander proceeding.
Exploration of such techniques is particularly appropriate today, as
there are now serious debates and reform efforts aimed at expanding
federal professional norms governing the conduct of state-licensed
lawyers in the federal courts.'01

98 See id. (explaining that the ARDC's failure to complete investigations on Cook, and its

response to the matter, caused the Seventh Circuit to consider the "continuing vitality of [their]
practice[]" of referring disciplinary matters to the ARDC, thus deeming it necessary to open
their own disciplinary proceeding).
99 Id.

Id. at 267-68.
101See Allen, supra note 16, at 201 (detailing the Justice Department's goal of regulating
the "No-Contact Rule" which would provide uniform regulations for government attorneys'
100
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New techniques for coordinating norm-enforcement systems for
lawyer misconduct during federal litigation can be explored by
considering how the responses to Cook's conduct by the ARDC, the
district judge, the district court, and the Seventh Circuit could have
been coordinated better.
For the Seventh Circuit, cooperation between norm-enforcement
systems in Cook chiefly entailed the coordination of two systems.
One is the "institutional control" system, which the district judge
used in sanctioning Cook for contempt. The other is the "disciplinary
control" system of the Illinois Supreme Court, the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, and the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, each of which could examine whether to continue Cook's
license to practice law. The Seventh Circuit neither addressed Judge
Rovner's choice to proceed against Cook in contempt as the only
vehicle for "institutional control," nor did it address other weapons
that may have been available in the "institutional control" arsenal
of her district court. The court also did not address whether any of
these other weapons should have been employed together with, or
instead of, contempt. Before exploring the relationships between the
contempt proceeding and the possible license-related "disciplinary
control" proceedings before the Illinois Supreme Court, the district
court, and the Seventh Circuit, other weapons in the district court's
"institutional control" arsenal will be examined first, as their
effective coordination should facilitate the achievement of enhanced
cooperation among norm enforcers.
A.

"InstitutionalControls" in the FederalDistrict Court

"Institutional controls" enforce professional norms for lawyers
where the governmental institutions in which the lawyers practice
(e.g., courts and agencies), undertake to uncover and sanction
internal lawyer misconduct.' °2 Because their reach is limited,
however, "the substantive jurisdiction of these institutional enforcement officials is likely to be confined to the area in which the
institution operates. For example, SEC officials cannot discipline
Thus, it seems that an
lawyers outside of the securities area."' °
conduct during criminal and civil investigations, applicable to both state and federal courts);
see generally Judicial Conference Report, supra note 17, at 370 (suggesting options for longterm reform, one of which is establishing a uniform national set of rules governing attorney
conduct in federal courts).
102 See Wilkins, supra note 1, at 807.
103Id. at 808.
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administrative law judge in a SEC adjudication can be concerned
primarily with the misconduct of a lawyer only during the adjudication. °4 Nevertheless, "institutional controls" can address effectively certain lawyer misconduct. The institution can respond quickly
and inexpensively because enforcement involves authorities who
often are "in a position to observe lawyer misconduct directly."'0 5
"Institutional controls" allow for flexibility in the scheduling of
hearings and in the timing of sanctions, and the institution often
contains enforcement officials who "are involved in a continuing
relationship" with lawyers. 10 6 This allows patterns of conduct to
be judged firsthand.
In the federal district court where Cook's misconduct initially
occurred, there were and are different ways in which "institutional
controls" operate to sanction a lawyer for misconduct before the
court. To address violations of professional norms involving, for
example, violations of pleading or discovery rules, Northern District
judges can act in the very cases in which the misconduct occurred.
Such norm-enforcement procedures (and often the applicable norms
themselves) are defined in the federal rules,' 7 statute,0 8 common law precedents outside of contempt,0 9 and in court orders of
contempt in pending cases."0 Judge Rovner acted on norm-enforcement only through proceedings for contempt of her court order.
As noted earlier, the court's Executive Committee has been and
remains responsible for the "discipline of attorneys.""' Cook's
contempt also could have triggered an "institutional control" response
by the Executive Committee. In many respects, such an Executive
Committee "institutional control" response to a lawyer's misconduct
104

See id. at 807-08 (explaining that some federal administrative agencies may request that

sanctions be imposed on lawyers who have not properly advised clients about their duties
under certain "regulatory regimes").
105

Id. at 808.

106 Id.
'0' See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (pleadings and motions); id. R. 37 (discovery). Incidentally,
efforts to unify norm-enforcement procedures for all federal civil rule violations have failed.
See id. R. 11(d) (stating that pleading standards are distinct from discovery standards).
...See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994) (providing that attorneys may be liable for excess costs
and expenses incurred because of unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of civil proceedings).
109 See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1980) (noting that aside
from contempt, there is comparable inherent authority over litigants and attorneys to achieve
order and expedition).
110 See, e.g., id. at 764 (stating that the contempt sanction is the "most prominent" exercise
of the federal courts' inherent authority).
" See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
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before a judge of the Northern District parallels the response to the
same misconduct by an agency within a "disciplinary control" system,
such as the Illinois ARDC." 2 Yet, unlike the Illinois ARDC and
other "disciplinary control" agencies, when focusing on lawyer
misconduct which occurred before one of its district judges, the
Northern District's Executive Committee is not an independent body
acting under the supervision of another court."' The Executive
Committee can act on an earlier criminal conviction or disciplinary
order imposed by another court, where its conduct is part of a
"disciplinary control" system, and the Executive Committee can
discipline a lawyer licensed by the court for violating the court's own
1
general norms in a case pending before a judge of the court."
There, such disciplinary action is a part of the Northern District's
"institutional control" system. The Northern District's norms in such
a disciplinary action have changed significantly since 1989-1990.
Misconduct triggering such Executive Committee action prior to 1991
typically involved the enforcement of the norms found in the A.B.A.
Code of Professional Responsibility; 115 since 1991, the relevant
norms are the court's own independently developed Rules of
Professional Conduct.1 6 These post-1991 rules, like the A.B.A.
Code, are more general in nature than the norms applicable in
certain types of cases (e.g., federal civil procedure rules on pleading

For example, both bodies can, and in 1989-1990 could, suspend a lawyer from the
practice of law for certain misconduct during litigation in a federal court. See, e.g., 1989 N.D.
GENERAL RULES 3.55(a), 3.56(f), supra note 83 (providing that Executive Committee
disciplinary proceedings can be initiated upon receipt of "a report of professional misconduct"
and can lead to disbarment, suspension or censure); 1995 N.D. GENERAL RULE 3.52(A), supra
note 90 (providing that the Executive Committee receives referrals of attorney misconduct or
allegations of misconduct where discipline might be warranted); see also ILL. SUP. CT. R.
751(a), 771 (providing that disciplinary proceedings are supervised by the ARDC and may lead
112

to disbarment, suspension or censure where the conduct violates professional responsibility
norms, brings the legal profession into disrepute, or tends to defeat the administration of justice).

.. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85 (stating that the Executive Committee is vested

with "disciplinary powers" to adjudicate matters of misconduct in the district court system).
114 See 1995 N.D. GENERAL RuLES 3.50-3.52, supra note 90.
...See Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 214 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976); see also 1989 N.D. GENERAL RULE 3.54(b), supra note
83 (providing that disbarment is the sanction for acts of professional misconduct such as fraud,

deceit, malpractice, or failure to abide by the provisions of the A.B.A. Code of Professional
Responsibility).
"a See 1995 N.D. GENERAL RULE 3.52(B), supra note 90.
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or discovery) or in a particular case as a result of a court order (e.g.,
contempt).117
When the Seventh Circuit lamented over Judge Rovner's failure to
open "disciplinary proceedings,"" 8 it may have been concerned with
her choice of contempt as the only vehicle employed for "institutional
control." Arguably, she also could have proceeded against Cook
under a federal rule," 9 her inherent authority, 2 ° or perhaps even
a statute.' 2 ' Also, the Seventh Circuit may have been concerned
that she failed to refer Cook either to her own court's Executive
Committee or to the ARDC. Yet the local rules of the Northern
District give its judges no guidance on these matters. 22 The
Seventh Circuit itself failed to instruct district judges on how to
blend "institutional" and "disciplinary controls." The following
sections discuss how lawyer litigation misconduct in a federal district
court can be handled better through the coordination of the district
court's "institutional controls," as well as through better reciprocal
cooperation between the district court's "institutional controls" and
the "disciplinary controls" of other courts, both federal and state.
B.

Coordinationof the Federal District Court's "Institutional
Controls"

In finding good cause to believe Cook made misrepresentations to
the court and bilked his clients, and in determining to do something
about it, Judge Rovner had available a variety of professional norms
and "institutional controls." Available norms appeared in the

117

See RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,

reprinted in ILLINOIS CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE & RULES OF COURT: STATE & FEDERAL (West
1996).
1 In re Cook, 49 F.3d 263, 267 (7th Cir. 1995).
119 Under FED. R. CIV. P. 11 in 1989-1990 and under its present version (effective Dec. 1,
1993), lawyers may be sanctioned for presenting frivolous papers or maintaining papers for
improper purposes. A history of changes to Rule 11 both in 1983 and in 1993 can be found in
Jeffrey A. Parness, Fines UnderNew Federal Civil Rule 11: The New Monetary Sanctions for
the "Stop-and-Think-Again"Rule, 1993 BYU L. REV. 879, 880-90.
120 See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980) (holding that in order
to sanction a lawyer by assessing attorney's fees under a federal court's inherent powers, the
lawyer's conduct in a case must "constitute[] or [be] tantamount to bad faith"); see also Republic
of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 74 n.l1 (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding that
the inherent power to sanction attorneys by means other than assessing attorneys' fees does
not require a finding of bad faith).
121 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994) (stating that attorneys may be liable for excess costs
and expenses incurred because of unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of proceedings).
122 See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
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generally applicable federal rules and statutes, 2 ' in her own
court's local rules,' and in her own particular orders directing
Cook to undertake certain conduct. 2 ' Some of the norms seemingly involved duties owed by Cook to his clients and to his clients'
adversaries, including both opposing parties and their lawyers.
Other norms involved duties owed to Judge Rovner and to the
Northern District which had licensed Cook to practice law.'
"Institutional controls" for norm-enforcement included sua sponte
proceedings on sanctions for violation of a rule or statute, referral to
her court's Executive Committee for possible discipline, and contempt
proceedings for violation of a court order.'27 As noted, Judge
Rovner had little guidance on how to choose among these norms and
controls. Of course, these norms and "institutional controls" could
have been used together with a referral to a disciplinary control
system of another court, including the Illinois Supreme Court and
the Seventh Circuit. Each of these two courts also had licensed Cook
to practice law, and their own norms addressed conduct occurring
outside their own courts and inside the Northern District. 2 ' Recall
that at the time of Cook's actions in 1989-1990, Judge Rovner was
subject to a Northern District local rule which recognized not only
the "disciplinary powers" of her court's Executive Committee, but
also her own authority to refer lawyer misconduct to state disciplinary bodies and to exercise "traditional powers ... to maintain

decorum, dignity and integrity in the courtroom and to compel
obedience to its orders through the contempt power."'29
Judge Rovner's choice to proceed in civil contempt seems quite
sensible. As a result, Cook's clients are more likely to obtain the
relief that Judge Rovner ordered earlier. And in the contempt
122

See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927; FED. R. Cv. P. 11.

See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text (detailing the local rules for the Northern
District of Illinois in effect at the time of Cook's misconduct).
125 See In re Cook, 49 F.3d 263, 264 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing Judge Rovner's order to Cook
to pay the residue of settlement funds to plaintiffs and holding him in contempt when he failed
'

to do so).

121 See id. at 264-65 (explaining Judge Rovner's rationale in holding Cook
in contempt and
whom she sought to protect by her actions).

See id. (listing the options that Judge Rovner had available).
See, e.g., ILL. RPC 8.5(a), supra note 3 ("A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction
is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's
conduct occurs."); see also FED. R. APP. P. 46(b) (providing that an attorney is "subject to
suspension or disbarment" for "conduct unbecoming a member of the bar"); id R. 46(c) (providing that a court of appeals has the power to take "any appropriate disciplinary action against
any attorney who practices before it for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar").
127
128

129

1989 N.D. GENERAL RULES 3.51(a), 3.55(a), supra note 83.
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process, Cook is pushed to think about his professional duties as an
officer of the court and as an agent of his clients.
While it is wise to recognize broad discretion in the federal district
judges to choose among available "institutional controls" when faced
with lawyer misconduct in a pending case, such controls could be
coordinated better and employed more equitably with some new local
rule amendments or with some new uniform national policy
expressed in generally applicable rules or statutes. Such law reforms
would promote more consistent treatment of comparable professional
misconduct in a single court. Uniform national policy is preferable,
for "a lawyer who has diverted funds from clients to himself [should
not] remain in good standing" while another lawyer who has engaged
in "mere lassitude" is suspended or disbarred from legal practice. 3 °
The differing treatment should not be determined by the unguided
choices of federal district judges, often aided by the parties who
pursue private interest sanctions (such as an award of attorney's
fees) in selecting which norms and norm-enforcement systems to
employ. 31 Fortunately, an available avenue presently exists to
consider uniform national policy on "institutional controls" within the
federal district courts. The U.S. Judicial Conference Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure is now examining local federal
district rules regulating attorney conduct.'32 In refining the "multidoor" approach to controlling lawyer misconduct during federal
district court litigation, the Committee should consider not only the
substantive norms, but also the available norm-enforcement systems.
In addressing coordination of district court institutional controls,
certain premises seem key. First, there are at least two forms of
"institutional controls" within every district court; the first is normenforcement by a district judge during the case in which the lawyer
misconduct occurs. The second form is norm-enforcement outside the
setting of a traditional civil or criminal case, usually within a
separate disciplinary proceeding before a body of the court's judges
with disciplinary authority delegated by local rule.' 3 While
typically there is only a single form of separate disciplinary proceeding in each district court, there are usually a variety of "institutional
110Cook, 49 F.3d at 267-68.

"' Similar criticism of the confusion caused by the differing standards and methods of
sanctioning pleading abuses in the federal district courts is found in Parness, supra note 13,
at 358-60.
"2 See Judicial Conference Report, supra note 17, at 339 (discussing recent local rule
revisions).
'3'See, e.g., 1995 N.D. GENERAL RULES 3.50, 3.51, 3.53, supra note 90.
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controls" available to a judge in a single case. "Institutional controls"

include proceedings for contempt, rule violations, or statutory
violations." 4 These controls vary, in that they may be spurred by
either a party's motion or by the district judge sua sponte, or both.
Second, some "institutional controls" within a case permit only
private interest sanctions, that is, sanctions which provide remedies
for the litigants harmed by lawyer misconduct during litigation.'3 5
Some permit only public interest sanctions, that is, sanctions which
benefit public, rather than private litigant, interests, 1 6 while
others allow judges a choice of either public or private interest
sanctions, or both." 7 Consider the differences between lawyer
responsibility for "the excess costs, expenses and attorneys' fees"
resulting from their unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of
case proceedings, 8' for a fine or imprisonment upon a summary
criminal contempt proceeding,' 3 9 and, for either "reasonable
attorneys' fees and other expenses" of a party or for a penalty
payable "into court" for bad pleadings. 4 °
Third, in a "multi-door" approach, several "institutional controls"
can be employed within a single case simultaneously or consecutively. Parties may call upon a variety of norms and norm enforcers
simultaneously for the same or different private interest sanctions
due to a single act of lawyer misconduct. Thus, motions regarding
rule and statutory violations are regularly joined.' 4 ' With particularly egregious lawyer misconduct, a district judge can order
consecutive "institutional control" proceedings. For example, a
party's motion for sanctions may be heard immediately if the
relevant attorney misconduct effects substantive legal results, while

See discussion supra Part III.A.
s' See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994) (providing that a court may order an attorney to
reimburse the opposing party for excessive costs due to unreasonable and vexatious
multiplication of proceedings).
136 See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1994) (providing that the court has the power to punish contempt
by fine or imprisonment).
137See, e.g., FED. R. Cr. P. 11(c)(2) (providing that the court may order an attorney who has
violated the rule to pay sanctions to either the opposing party or the court).
13828 U.S.C. § 1927.
13. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402, 3691 (providing that the court has the power to punish
contempt by fine or imprisonment and that an attorney may request a jury trial if charged
with criminal contempt).
140 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
141 See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767-68 (1980)
(affirming the
decision of violation of 28 U.S.C § 1927, but rejecting the claim that "costs" include attorneys'
fees, and remanding for determination of violation of FED. R. Civ. P. 37).
134
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other lawyer misconduct may be held over for a separate public
interest disciplinary action.'42
Fourth, while many federal district courts expressly vest the
court's "disciplinary" authority by local rule in their Executive
Committee or a similar body of judges,' this disciplinary authority is not fully exclusive. Thus, individual judges within pending
cases can also discipline errant lawyers in what might be called
"vigilante discipline."'" Yet, certain disciplinary sanctions, such
as disbarment, i.e., termination of the license to practice law in the
court, should be within the sole power of some judicial body or
independent agency.4

In taking these premises into account, the U.S. Judicial Conference
(Conference) would promote better coordination of the district court's
"institutional controls" by surveying, and then comparing, both the
available norms and the relevant norm-enforcement systems so that
all district judges would become better informed of the available
alternatives in the "multi-door" approach. By elaborating on the
differences in certain norms and their norm-enforcement systems, as
well as by urging the elimination of any irrational differences, the
Conference would promote a more uniform, or national, approach to
similar instances of attorney misconduct where local tradition,
circumstances, and the like, do not warrant district to district
142

See In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 162 F.R.D. 46, 81 (D.V.I. 1995) (ordering

attorneys to appear at a separate hearing to determine the "nature and extent of sanctions
warranted by [the attorneys'] misconduct" where the court found the attorneys had committed
discovery violations), opinion clarified by 162 F.R.D. 81 (D.V.I. 1995); see also Mullenix, supra
note 6, at 128-29 (urging that federal courts develop a means of separating ethical challenges
that affect substantive legal claims and those that are collateral to the underlying legal
dispute, with the result that the former type of ethical challenge is heard during the
adjudication, while the latter type is referred to an independent federal grievance commission).
143 See, e.g., In re Jacobs, 44 F.3d 84, 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that in the Eastern
District of New York, the chief judge of the district court appoints a "board of judges known
as the committee on grievances," as well as an advisory panel of attorneys to assist the
grievance committee), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 73 (1995); see generally Agata, supra note 23
(noting the great variation among district courts).
144 Parness, supra note 94, at 59-61 (stating that "serious professional misconduct by
attorneys during federal civil litigation is best left to traditional state disciplinary agencies,
and that less serious misconduct is best handled by the trial judge presiding in the relevant
civil case").
145 But see Baldwin Hardware Corp. v. Franksu Enter. Corp., 78 F.3d 550, 561-64 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (affirming district judge's order permanently and prospectively barring an attorney from
appearing before him pro hac vice); In re Maurice, 73 F.3d 124, 126-27 (7th Cir. 1995)
(suspending attorney from practice of law in all federal courts within the circuit until certain
conditions were met); Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F.Supp. 1162, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (ordering
attorneys to show cause "why they should not be suspended from practice" after assessing fees
and costs under FED. R. Civ. P. 11).
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variation. Coordination among a single district court's varying
"institutional controls" would be enhanced if:
1.

2.

3.

4.

Exclusive authority was delegated expressly to
an independent body within the court, such as its
Executive Committee, to disbar or suspend a
lawyer from practice before the court, or before
any judge of the court, because of litigation
misconduct during a case;
Proceedings before such a body for possible
suspension or disbarment were facilitated by
requirements that district judges refer certain
instances of lawyer conduct (e.g., egregious
146
misconduct) to the body;
The use of issue preclusion was facilitated in
such license proceedings by requiring district
judges employing "institutional controls" in
addressing lawyer misconduct to undertake
certain processes, including mandates on notice,
opportunity to be heard, factual findings, and
conclusions of law;
The body within the district court responsible for
license proceedings also was assigned information-gathering duties regarding all lawyers
licensed to practice before the court, aided by
new reporting duties or options for district
judges, lawyers, witnesses and others knowing of
their own or some other lawyer's misconduct of
certain types. Standardized reporting forms
would make it even easier for the court's license
review body to gain "superior perspective" on a
lawyer's pattern of conduct; and

'"
Upon receipt of such referrals, the body would determine whether to proceed itself, or
delay its own proceeding pending a referral to a state disciplinary agency, or to some other
federal court disciplinary agency, which may already have begun a license review hearing. See
Parness, oupra note 94, at 59-61 (suggesting that "disciplinary referrals should be guided by
the principles that serious professional misconduct by attorneys during federal civil litigation
is best left to traditional state disciplinary agencies, and that less serious misconduct is best
handled by the trial judge").
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5.

C.

Limits were placed on a lawyer's ability to
eliminate afterward, or avoid beforehand, judicial
findings within a case relating to that lawyer's
misconduct during the case.147
Cooperative FederalismBetween Federal Courts and State
DisciplinaryAgencies

The Seventh Circuit determined that it could not condone Cook's
actions in "[c]ircumventing and ignoring district court orders."'
Therefore, in 1991 the court referred Cook to the Illinois ARDC,
without opening its own disciplinary proceeding.' 49 When the
ARDC complaint against Cook was dismissed after Judge Rovner
refused to testify, the Seventh Circuit could not employ its rule on
reciprocal discipline. The Seventh Circuit lamented that the ARDC
action constituted a failure of reciprocal cooperative federalism
between Illinois federal courts concerned with a lawyer's misconduct
during federal litigation 5 ° and the lawyer disciplinary agency in
Illinois where that lawyer was licensed to practice, especially as the
Illinois license allowed the attorney to practice in two additional
After the ARDC inaction, the Seventh
Illinois federal courts.'
Circuit began its own disciplinary proceeding against Cook for his
misconduct in 1989-1990 before Judge Rovner. 1 52 This proceeding,
which led to Cook's suspension, was held before a Seventh Circuit
panel of three judges different from the panel that made the
referral. 5 ' One judge sat on both panels, however, he authored

147

While an appeal was pending in the Seventh Circuit, a settlement was reached over the

litigation expenses awarded to Cook. The agreement directed "the district court to vacate its
opinion (which had been highly critical of Cook's ethics and performance)." In re Cook, 49 F.3d
263, 264 (7th Cir. 1995). Had the opinion not been vacated, the appeals would have been
reinstated. See Alexander v. Chicago Park Dist., 927 F.2d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 1991).
148 Alexander, 927 F.2d at 1025.
149

See id.

150 See Cook, 49 F.3d at 265-66.

'51 See 1995 N.D. GENERAL RULE 3.00(A), supra note 90 (stating that "[a]n applicant for
admission... must be a member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of any

state... or of the District of Columbia"); FED. R. APP. P. 46(a) (stating that "[an attorney who
has been admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the United States, or the highest
court of a state, or another United States court of appeals, or a United States district
court... and who is of good moral and professional character, is eligible for admission").
152

See Cook, 49 F.3d at 263.

3 See id. at 264 (disciplinary proceeding before Circuit Judges Easterbrook, Ripple and
Kanne which resulted in the suspension of Cook's membership in the Illinois bar); Alexander,
927 F.2d at 1015 (referral ordered by Circuit Judges Posner, Ripple and Manion).
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neither the opinion which affirmed the finding of contempt, nor the
opinion which suspended Cook-from practice."'
As noted earlier, Illinois Supreme Court rules were read by the
ARDC Hearing Board to require a new hearing to consider the Cook
referral by the Seventh Circuit.'55 If the Hearing Board was
correct, the rules also prohibited the ARDC from using as evidence
the federal court's findings on Cook's conduct. 5 6 Reciprocal
cooperative federalism would be enhanced if conclusive, or at least
significant, evidentiary status was accorded to the federal court
findings of an Illinois lawyer's misconduct in the federal court. 57
The major rationales offered against such respect seemingly are that
"Illinois does not use offensive nonmutual issue preclusion in
attorney disciplinary proceedings,"' 58 or perhaps that "subsidiary
issues" in federal court judgments need not be respected.5 9
As noted by the Seventh Circuit, In re Owens 6 ° is the major
Illinois precedent regarding offensive nonmutual issue preclusion.' 6 ' Yet, Illinois ARDC Hearing Boards should conclude that
this case does not preclude them from deferring to findings of lawyer
misconduct made by a federal court in later ARDC proceedings. In
Owens, the Illinois high court ruled that "factual findings based on
'clear and convincing evidence... in an earlier Illinois civil court fraud
action, brought by former clients against two lawyers, were not
entitled to offensive collateral estoppel effect in a later ARDC
proceeding against the two lawyers.'62 Clearly, Illinois supplied
the applicable collateral estoppel law.'63 Despite this, the Illinois
Supreme Court frowned upon relegating the fact-finding function in
a lawyer disciplinary proceeding to mechanisms "outside of formal
disciplinary proceedings."' 64 When it does so, as when a criminal
...See Cook, 49 F.3d at 264 (Judge Ripple concurred in Judge Easterbrook's opinion);
Alexander, 927 F.2d at 1015 (Judge Ripple concurred in Judge Manion's opinion).
' See supra text accompanying notes 60-65.
156 See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
157 See Cook, 49 F.3d at 266 (stating that a state "is not free to prefer its internal processes
to those of the federal courts and to decline to respect federal judgments").
158 Id.
"' Id. (citing Stephen B. Burbank, InterjurisdictionalPreclusion,Full Faithand Creditand
Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 791-97 (1986))
"0 532 N.E.2d 248 (Ill. 1988).
"'

See Cook, 49 F.3d at 266.

102 See Owens, 532 N.E.2d at 252.

"e See id. (holding that in Illinois, courts could go beyond the "threshold requirements" for
collateral estoppel in their application of offensive collateral estoppel to ensure fundamental
fairness to defendants).
164 Id.
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conviction is used in an ARDC proceeding, the high court said that
it is more assured that the lawyer "made every reasonable effort to
cast doubt on his guilt."165 Also, it can "more confidently rely" on
the earlier findings because the burden of proof is "extremely high,
higher than is the burden of proof in a disciplinary proceeding."166
Whatever merit there is in the ARDC not according respect to an
earlier Illinois civil court's findings on fraud, two reasons exist why
the Owens court's rationales are inapplicable to many lawyer
misconduct findings in earlier federal court proceedings where the
burden of proof is comparable. First, it is federal collateral estoppel
law which applies, as federal law determines the res judicata effects
of a federal court judgment.'67 Second, the Illinois Supreme Court
already recognizes that absolute deference must be accorded to
earlier findings outside criminal courts, because its reciprocal
discipline rule provides that factual findings on lawyer misconduct
during foreign state disciplinary proceedings normally should be
deemed conclusive by the ARDC.'68 No good reason exists why
other states' disciplinary proceedings should be respected, but not a
federal court contempt proceeding. While a per se rule requiring the
ARDC to treat as conclusive all federal court findings of lawyer
misconduct, regardless of context, may be overly broad,'69 deference
165

Id.

...Id. A very different, and more deferential, approach to applying issue preclusion in state
disciplinary proceedings to earlier civil fraud findings is found in IowA Sup. CT. R. 118.7
(stating that issue preclusion may be used where there is a final judgment in a civil case whose
burden of proof is greater than preponderance of the evidence). See Iowa Supreme Court Bd.
of Profl Ethics and Conduct v. D.J.I., 545 N.W.2d 866 (Iowa 1996) (afirrming use of IOWA SUP.
CT. R. 118.7 to invoke issue preclusion); Bar Counsel v. Board of Bar Overseers, 647 N.E.2d
1182, 1184 (Mass. 1995) (holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is appropriate in "bar
discipline cases to the same extent that it applies to civil cases").
167 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 87 (1982) (stating that Articles I and III
of the U.S. Constitution are the source of the federal courts' authority and that "in the absence
of some other provision by Congress, the effects of a federal judgment are a legal implication
of those provisions"); see also Burbank, InterjurisdictionalPreclusion, Full Faith and Credit
and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 776-77 (1986)
(stating that "[aifter a federal court adjudicates matters of federal law," uniform federal law
will determine whether strangers can use findings offensively or defensively in later state
litigation).
168 See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 763.
109 For example, the burdens of proof may differ. Many federal institutional controls
addressing attorney misconduct, such as FED. R. Civ. P. 11, do not require proof by clear and
convincing evidence. Nevertheless, foreign state disciplinary actions founded on less than clear
and convincing evidence may still be conclusive in Illinois. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 763; Wolfram,
supra note 13, at 292 n.47 (demonstrating that a few states use the "'preponderance of the
evidence' standard in attorney discipline cases"); see also In re Friedman, 609 N.Y.S.2d 578,
586 (App. Div. 1994) (holding that due process was not violated when the fair preponderance
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should not be foreclosed altogether for such findings. A new Illinois
Supreme Court recognizing guidelines that accord conclusive effect
to certain earlier federal court lawyer misconduct findings would
promote cooperative federalism.
Cooperative federalism also would be promoted if federal court
lawyer misconduct findings would be recognized as admissible
evidence, though nonconclusive, in later ARDC proceedings. It is
hard to imagine that lawyer misconduct constituting contempt
involves "subsidiary" issues lightly decided and undeserving of any
recognition. 7 ° While the Illinois Supreme Court Rules directed the
ARDC Hearing Board to consider evidence in the Cook inquiry in
accordance with the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, other Illinois
Supreme Court Rules, and ARDC Rules, 7 ' the Hearing Board
deemed Judge Rovner's findings inadmissible upon her refusal to
testify.'72 Yet it did not explain why certain exceptions to the
hearsay rule were not germane and why her findings were otherwise
unreliable.'73 It was concerned that employing the findings would
deprive Cook of an opportunity to cross-examine Judge Rovner. But
of the evidence is the standard in an attorney disciplinary proceeding), appeal dismissed, 635
N.E.2d 295 (N.Y. 1994), and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 810 (1994). Incidentally, the standard of
proof in disciplinary cases before the Northern District Executive Committee may be only
preponderance of the evidence. See 1995 N.D. GENERAL RULES 3.50, 3.51, 3.53, supranote 90;
see also In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 486-87 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that the clear and
convincing evidence standard used by the Illinois court was as demanding as the federal
approach, though the federal approach may require only preponderance of the evidence).
170 See In re Cook, 49 F.3d 263, 266 (7th Cir. 1995). The Seventh Circuit urged the ARDC
to give close consideration to the "subsidiary issues" point when handling subsequent federal
court referrals. See id. (citing Burbank, supra note 167, at 791-97). On subsidiary issues, see,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF JUDGEMENTS § 27 cmt. j (1982) ("The appropriate question..., is whether the issue was actually recognized by the parties as important and by the
trier [of fact] as necessary .... If so, the determination is conclusive between the parties in
a subsequent action, unless there is a basis for an exception .. .
171 See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 753(c)(5)-(6).
172 See ARDC Order, supra note 77, at C510 (excluding Judge Rovner's remarks because
they fell "outside the realm of 'readily verifiable facts which are capable of instant and
unquestioned demonstration'" and excluding the "'balance' of the documents as evidence ...[because] the Hearing Panel question[ed] whether or not the 'balance' of the
documents ha[d] any evidentiary value" (quoting May Dept. Stores v. Teamster's Union Local
No. 743, 355 N.E.2d 7, 9 (Ill. 1976))).
171 See id.; cf In re Friedman, 51 F.3d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that respondent
in
disciplinary proceeding who contests earlier finding by another disciplinary agency has no right
to an evidentiary hearing, only a right to be heard which should be used to demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that the earlier agency's procedures were wanting), cert. denied,
116 S.Ct. 1040 (1996); In re Jacobs, 44 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting the claim that "an
attorney subject to a state disciplinary proceeding enjoys the full panoply of federal constitutional protections" and that an advisory panel's denial of the attorney's request for an
evidentiary hearing did not violate due process), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 73 (1996).
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it failed to explain in any significant way why an adequate opportunity to challenge Judge Rovner had not been available in the federal
court contempt proceeding. Further, it articulated neither the
factual issues that would necessitate Judge Rovner's testimony, nor
the special procedures required to receive her testimony.174
Cooperative federalism between Illinois federal courts and the
Illinois ARDC also would be promoted if federal court referrals of
lawyer misconduct were more standardized. Here again, the U.S.
Judicial Conference could help by formulating guidelines. Copies of
federal judicial opinions containing findings of lawyer misconduct are
not always sufficient to inform state lawyer disciplinary agencies.
Recall that in Cook, the Seventh Circuit referral constituted an
opinion affirming an order finding Rufus Cook in contempt;17 5 yet
the contempt was not the only actual or possible misconduct by Cook
during the federal litigation.'7 6 The Seventh Circuit could have
aided the ARDC by referring other relevant instances of misconduct
which were found by the district or appeals court, along with other
useful information, such as the burden of proof employed. An
opinion sustaining a lower court order serves many different
purposes, but it should be separate from an order explaining a
referral of lawyer misconduct to a state disciplinary agency.
Guidelines prompted by a U.S. Judicial Conference inquiry would
also be helpful in determining: when federal court "institutional
controls" alone would be appropriate to address lawyer misconduct
in federal litigation; when referrals to state disciplinary agencies
alone would suffice; and when both federal "institutional controls"

...ARDC order, supra note 77, at C511 (declaring that the federal court findings and other
documents are inadmissible unless Judge Rovner is available for a deposition and agrees to
testify at a trial on the ARDC charges). In indicating Judge Rovner was not then able to
testify, the U.S. Attorney objected on grounds ofjudicial independence and that the information
was available from other sources, however, he did recognize her testimony would be forthcoming if "unusual circumstances" were shown. See Letter from Michael J. Shepard, U.S.
Attorney, to Mary Foster, ARDC Counsel (Oct. 12, 1993) in Vol. III, supra note 65, at C496.
Cf. Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354, 1366 (8th Cir. 1996) (Beam, C.J., concurring specially)
(stating that the trial judge can carefully supervise civil litigation involving the testimony of
the President, with "maximum consideration" given to the President's constitutional duties),
cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996).
"' See Alexander v. Chicago Park Dist., 927 F.2d 1014, 1025 (7th Cir. 1991) (affirming the
district court's order and stating that "a copy of this opinion will be submitted to the Illinois
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission with a suggestion that it investigate the
conduct of Rufus Cook").
176 See id. at 1018-19 (reviewing Judge Rovner's critical assessment of Cook's request for
litigation expenses). In fact, prior to the referral, the ARDC had already investigated Cook's
conduct in the case before Judge Rovner. See supra note 42.
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and state disciplinary referrals should be undertaken. In the Cook
litigation, for example, neither the Seventh Circuit opinion referring
Cook to the ARDC, nor the later Seventh Circuit order suspending
Cook from the practice of law, explained why a federal court
disciplinary proceeding had to await ARDC inquiry. To limit ad hoc
decisionmaking, the U.S. Judicial Conference should consider
guidelines that would attempt to standardize federal court disciplinary referrals and "institutional control" practices.
D. CoordinationBetween FederalDistrict and Appellate Court
Disciplinarians
Finally, aside from the need for better coordination of a trial
court's "institutional controls" and better cooperation between federal
courts and state disciplinary agencies, Cook demonstrates the need
for better coordination of inquiries into lawyer misconduct by the
federal district and appeals courts.
In 1995, the Seventh Circuit suspended Rufus Cook for his 19891990 misconduct in the federal district court, and openly questioned
why the district court had not "opened its own disciplinary proceeding."'77 The court never explained why it failed to open an appellate court disciplinary proceeding against Cook upon affirming his
acts of contempt in 1991, nor did the court explain why it did not
refer Cook, in 1991, to the Executive Committee of the Northern
District, nor did it consider sanctioning Cook for pursuing a frivolous
appeal. Further, the court failed to explain why its own 1994 show
cause order on why Cook should not be disciplined. 8 included
references to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure as well as to
Seventh Circuit Rule 38. The referenced Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure cover not only "suspension or disbarment"'79 but also
"disciplinary action," 8 ° while Seventh Circuit Rule 38, which deals
with "sanctions on... an attorney as otherwise authorized by
law,"18
" seemingly draws authority from Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 38 to "award just damages and single or double costs to
the appellee" for frivolous appeals.'82 Evidently, in 1994 the court
117
171

In re Cook, 49 F.3d 263, 267 (7th Cir. 1995).
See Order to Show Cause, In the Matter of Disciplinary Action Against: Attorney Rufus

Cook, No. D-217 (June 13, 1994).
179 FED. R. APp. P. 46(b).
180

Id. R. 46(c).

'8' 7TH CIR. R. 38.
182

FED. R. APP. P. 38.
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was willing to consider, after the ARDC proceeding, not only Cook's
suspension or disbarment, but also other forms of discipline and
sanctions involving monies to be received by private parties who
were compelled to defend against a frivolous appeal pursued by Cook
a few years earlier. In its 1995 order, the court did not explain why
an award of damages and costs was not forthcoming. Further, in
1995, the court did not address the circumstances under which
attorney misconduct in the federal courts should be addressed
immediately, either via a sanction awarded to a private party or via
"vigilante" discipline (such as a reprimand). Moreover, it did not
address how federal trial and appellate court efforts should be
coordinated better in the future with regard to attorney misconduct.
U.S. Judicial Conference study and guidance are needed here.
Certain principles shoidld underlie the coordination of federal
district and appeals court efforts regarding lawyer misconduct during
federal litigation. First, district judges, via a body such as an
Executive Committee, should be responsible primarily for traditional
lawyer discipline arising out of lawyer misconduct in federal
litigation, whether the conduct occurred before an appellate court, a
district court, or before a magistrate or bankruptcy judge. Much of
the lawyer misconduct in the Article III courts occurs before district
judges, and such judges are accomplished hearing providers and fact
finders. Circuit-wide disciplinary bodies have some appeal, but
calling in lawyers far from home or far from where their alleged
misconduct occurred seems too burdensome. District court disciplinary bodies should focus primarily on issues involving licenses to
practice law. "Institutional controls," such as vigilante discipline for
pleading or discovery abuse, of course, may still be utilized by
individual federal appellate judges and by the federal magistrate,
bankruptcy and district judges where a "multi-door" approach is
warranted. Once suspension, disbarment, and the like are determined at the district court level, reciprocal discipline can occur in the
federal appeals court and in other federal adjudicatory settings (and,
presumably, in the state high court).
Second, federal district court disciplinary bodies, such as the
Northern District Executive Committee, should operate under
guidelines setting forth the means by which federal judges and
others can report actual and alleged lawyer misconduct. Such
guidelines should be part of a uniform federal policy for all district
court disciplinary bodies. Upon receipt of reports, standards are
needed on the issue preclusion effects of earlier factual findings
made by judges who address lawyer misconduct in "institutional
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control" settings.
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Thus, at least upon the affirmance of Cook's

contempt before Judge Rovner, the Northern District Executive
Committee should have received a referral of the factual findings
underlying the contempt, as well as reports of any other actual or
alleged egregious misconduct (e.g., a rule or statutory violation, or
conduct unbecoming an attorney).'8 8
IV. CONCLUSION

Spurred by a U.S. Judicial Conference inquiry, there is now
serious debate over the appropriate professional norms for lawyers
litigating in the federal courts. Unfortunately, little attention has
yet been focused on appropriate norm-enforcement systems. As a
"multi-door" approach to such professional norm-enforcement is
likely to continue at both the federal and state levels, serious
discussion of the techniques for reciprocal cooperation between all
norm enforcers becomes necessary. Such coordination was found
wanting by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the federal and
state enforcement proceedings involving Cook's misconduct in a
federal district court.'
But the Seventh Circuit offered little
guidance on enhancing reciprocal cooperation between norm
enforcers. Better coordination requires examination of each federal
district court's "institutional controls" on lawyer conduct, of the
appropriate interplay between federal district and appeals courts'
"institutional" and "disciplinary controls," and of the relationship
between the federal trial and appellate courts' norm enforcers and
the relevant state disciplinary controls. The U.S. Judicial Conference
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure should
undertake such examinations as it discusses the breadth and content
of appropriate professional norms for state-licensed lawyers
practicing in the federal courts.

...The Seventh Circuit, even before its disappointment with the ARDC proceedings against
Cook, did not always refer sanctionable attorneys to the state disciplinary agencies, though
there were benefits in "cooperative federalism." See In re Cook, 49 F.3d 263, 265 (7th Cir.
1995); see also Phillips Med. Sys. Int'l B.V. v. Bruetman, 8 F.3d 600, 607 (7th Cir. 1993) (referring case to Executive Committee of Northern District). Arguably, the new rule provisions on
federal appellate court practices, effective in December 1995, counsel against ad hoc
decisionmaking in favor of more standard practices articulated in local court rules. See FED.
R. APP. P. 47(a)(1) ("A generally applicable direction to ...a lawyer regarding practice ... shall be in a local rule rather than an internal operating procedure or standing
order.").
184 See Cook, 49 F.3d at 266 (pointing to the ARDC's failure to take a cooperative approach).

